Straining Pulp-Theory from Architecture Discourse: a symposium

The 14th of June 2010, a symposium will be held at Newcastle University. The objective of the symposium is to engender as well as provide an informal platform for real philosophic engagement with the subject of architecture. The intention of doing so is not merely to raise questions about architecture, but also in a Wittgensteinian sense, bring clarity to an otherwise metaphysically muddled discourse. Again John Haldane eloquently describes the situation:

the facts of disagreement should encourage one to investigate the grounds of aesthetic judgement and the possibilities of establishing by reason-giving the superiority of one building or scheme over another. Too often it is simply assumed that disagreement over values within a community is proof of the subjective character of the rival attitudes. What is more rarely noticed is that a necessary condition of there being such disputes is that all parties to them share a common presupposed belief in the objectivity of value (Haldane 1990: 204-5).

This is no easy task. Karsten Harries’ 1987 article entitled, “Philosophy and the Task of Architecture” is particularly illustrative of the problems of philosophically engaging with the topic of architecture, pointing out that philosophers and architects think differently about architecture (Harries 1987: 29). On the one hand, philosophers often are no more than dilettantes when it comes to the subject of architecture and building, tending to focus on problems relevant to the philosophical discourse than those relevant to architecture. On the other hand, architects often fail to understand the import of philosophy, generally, and in their discipline. Amongst those that purport to understand is a tendency to ‘theory shop’ and produce what Haldane described as ‘quasi-philosophical ideas’ with regards to building. These theory shoppers fail to understand the ideas and methods assumed in their equally as dilettante readings of philosophy, and results in curious movements. An example of this is the use of Derrida’s Deconstructionism by Eisenman and acolytes.

In an attempt to focus on an area which is relevant both to the philosopher’s and the architect’s disciplinary interests, presenters are asked to engage with ideas relating to there being a universal conception of architecture. Clearly relating to utopias and idealism in architecture, the intention is to begin the discussion at a point where the two disciplines already converge.

t h e m e . . .

Submissions relating to but are not limited to the following:

• what architecture is
• the concept of utopia in architecture
• idealism in architecture

Other topics might include the following:

• the difference between architecture and building
• the genesis and philosophical underpinnings of an architecture movement
• the impacts of a philosophical movement on an architecture discourse

Please send submissions for IsPa review to carolyn.fahey@ncl.ac.uk by April 2010. As further details of the symposium develop, this information will be added as a ‘comment’ to this post. Please check back for more up-to-date information or feel free to contact us with any queries you might have.

Essentialism and Architecture by Carolyn Fahey and Commentator

Over the summer I presented a paper entitled, ‘Understanding Architecture as Anti-Essential’ at the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria (the village neighbours Trattenbach where Wittgenstein once worked as a school teacher). Apparently by googling my name one of our blog’s commentators found the title of this piece and made this comment via email :

“architecture is essentially anti-essential. Any attempt to search for Truth, which essentialism would require us to do, would be to say that architecture existed solely in the realm of human construction (language) and not as a negotiation between the natural and human dimensions.”

To which I responded:

“I do not think there can be an essence of nothing. It seems to go against the very definition of the word essence. Additionally, I do not think of humans as outside of nature and would argue that architecture is an abstract construction as opposed to some tangible and objectively identifiable object of some kind.”

The commentator responded saying:

“In terms of anti-essentialism (a bit of a silly word but all we have at the moment to go with) I believe you are thinking about it in essentialst terms, as in binary absolutes (this or that). But the reference to language and nature isn’t positioning them as opposites but to say that one is not really involved in the other. So we attempt to construct language in order to define absolute truths (essenses) that exist outside of that dialogue (i.e. in the natural word that human’s cannot directly change or affect through words).

In my view and position, architecture has a particular language and is abstract as the relationship between terms rather than being the thing in itself. I agree with you on this, but I don’t think it is quite as abstract as I think you are positioning it. There is the danger of mistaking two subjects when they get very close together and share aspects of the same language – we have that issue, I believe, with the discipline of architecture and the practice of architecture, the first which is the vehicle for the first but not the ‘thing itself’.”

In this comment there seems to be many points made. I will list them as I see them:

• binary absolutes: To be honest, I am not sure that I understand fully this reference. Assuming that I do understand correctly, I would say that understanding architecture as anti-essentialist merely means understanding the localised limitations of ones knowledge of building and its cultural relevance. Taking this on, means that what is outside of that either does not exist or is outside one’s perview. If this is the case, there is nothing to be concerned about beyond this localised notion which seems then to mean that there cannot be anything of which we should identify as being our concern, whether of 1 or 0. Hence, we cannot even concern ourselves with what is not part of our understanding and therefore there cannot be an essence of what we cannot know.
• language and nature are not involved with one another: I think language and nature are irreducibly related. Of course it is often the perception that language serves to represent nature, but it does have a nature if you will of its own at times. Further to this, that we separate the mind from the body, or the human from nature, or the thought from practice, is something I view as a reminant of Cartesianism. Wittgenstein’s work, for instance, was in part aiming to contend with this paradigm often thought of as arising out of Cartesianism.
• language is used to construct essences which represent something in nature: I agree that language is used to further clarify essences, but a Wittgensteinian would say that to some degree or in many cases there is no need to use language to define this said essence as our knowledge of it is already known and that using language to represent it or define it as it were only serves to confuse and muddle what already exists. So my position would be that language is not merely or only used to construct essences. It serves other purposes.
• contends with the position that architecture is not a thing: I think that in taking on the view that architecture is not a thing, is not problematic in so far as one is careful to recognise that we still have building as something tangible which sits in front of us.

 Although this is a lengthy response, it is clear that I only briefly touched on some of the issues our commentator raises. Yet, as the purpose of this blog is to open these sorts of discussions to a wider audience, at this point I would like to invite others to participate. Interested to know what others might think.

What i s architecture? by Carolyn Fahey

Sometimes I wonder whether we in the architecture profession and academe do not forget about some of the presuppositions our discipline depends on. There are many of these. Say that architecture is to have certain identifiable qualities that could say be incorporated into a design pedagogy: space, order, composition, etc. Although interesting topics to explore, this is not my interest in this short post. My interest rather relates to a much more deeply rooted issue. It relates t0 our claim of architecture.

It is fascinating to me that we can claim that we know what architecture is – that it is some sort of shared concept despite its esoteric qualities. Like the debates that have been raging for sometime in art, it is not clear that we do in fact know what it is. If this is the case, then it seems necessary – even imperative - that those responsible for this discipline seriously consider sustained introspection.

In response to what I would identify as a disciplinary need, I wonder to what extent we presuppose the physical qualities of building we count as architecture. Is architecture necessarily something physical? Must some image of architecture be manifest in-built form for there to be architecture? Clearly in the case of the newly developed field of computer architecture, there is not anything physical which amounts to there being ‘architecture’ but rather a system of organisation that everyone involved in agrees to either openly or passively. Could this not also be the case for the ancient discipline of building?

I do not mean to say that building is not there; that it is not tangible or otherwise physical. I mean to say, that what we take to be architecture is no more that a particular image of building which can only be found in certain elevated kinds of building. If this is the case, it seems that there is no such thing as architecture. There is building and then there is building elevated by theory and history to a point of exaltation.

This point of elevation is clear in looking to the etymology of the words vernacular and architecture. The word vernacular is the building of the slaves whereas architecture proper is the building of the masters (and one might add for the masters). There are clear political and social hierarchies active in defining what is and is not vernacular. Nevertheless, my interest is mere existence of this hierarchy and its claim on building, not its character. I will leave that for political philosophers to grapple with. This master-level class, if I dare say, is capable of elevating building to an emperor-like status. The Villa Savoye is an instance of this phenomenon. 

The Villa Savoye (Figure 1) is normally heralded as encapsulating the design principles of (in)famous artist/architect Le Corbusier. But what about this building is remarkable? What about this building makes it architecture? The use of pilotis? Of horizontal windows? Quite possibly, or at least this is what the discourse tells us. Yet I wonder whether there is something more going on here. Why is it that we celebrate – glorify – this particular building and its use of pilotis and horizontal windows as Modernity’s best representation?

Figure 1: View of stairway in the Villa Savoye.

Furthermore, why does this building capture what architecture is for Modernists and does do as much for postmodernists as well as contemporary architects? It seems to me that the myth surrounding this building – the myth that social prescription via machine-like building was desirable – was broken. The entire Modern oeuvre was broken. A clear instance of this demystification is found in Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction published some fifty years after the completion of Le Corbusier’s masterpiece. In my mind, Venturi acted as the man who pointed out the emperor (the building, in this case the Villa Savoye) was not wearing his clothes. This did not necessarily take from the emperor his position but took from him the fascination and gravitas granted him by his new clothes.

 

Figure 2: Illustration by Vilhelm Pedersen, Hans Christian Andersen’s first illustrator of The Emperor’s New Clothes (1837).

 

References:

Arnold, D. and Ballantyne, A. (eds.) (2004) Architecture as Experience: Radical change in spatial practice. New York: Routledge.

Ballantyne, A. (ed.) (2002) What is Architecture? New York: Routledge.

Cavell, S. (1979) The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tilghman, B. (2006) Reflections on Aesthetic Judgment and Other Essays. Hampshire: Ashgate.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

  

Images:

Figure 1: (2009) Architypes.  Available at: http://architypes.net/ (Accessed: 10 December).

Figure 2: (2009) Vilhelm Pederson Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor’s_New_Clothes (Accessed: 10 December).

Concretism and Critique by Kati Blom

Figure 1

 

Back in Finland, I participated in the 11^th International Alvar Aalto Symposium. The symposium had an extremely interesting theme which sought to reach out to the edges of profession by introducing modest but professionally respectful approaches to local problems of five continents. As it happened, the theme was concretisedby architects who believe in and seek to implement participation and local craftsmanship. These architects also believed in using international money and generally minimizing the amount of local money. There was one exception. It was an Argentinean pair – Mauricio Pezo and Sophia von Ellrichshausen – who work in Chile exclusively designing single-family houses using a local concrete technique.  

Figure 2

 

The presentation was astonishing. The Argentinean speakers did not want to talk about social values at all. They concentrated on the spatial poetry of the buildings, whereas all the other speakers were tied to the social, technological and managerial aspects of architecture only. Even if the results of these methods (shown in Figures 1 & 2) were outspokenly ‘beautiful’, and even if the aesthetic or formal aspects were not mentioned in the presentations, they looked to represent the contemporary concretism. Concretism can be taken as the materially based, practical approach to architecture. In stark contrast to this were the projects presented by Hollmén, Reuter and Sandman (Finland), and projects by Anna Heringer (Austria). The contrast was annoying and provoked a great deal of discussion during evening gatherings. The Argentinean couple’s work was seen as elitist, formal – basic – a-ethical. Yet this description would not be a critical remark per se. 

Figure 3

 

Even the websites of their three practices are different. An axometric is typical of Pezo’s approach, whereas sensitive hand-drawn elevations are typical of Anna Heringer. These differences are furthermore evident in the title of each presentation title. The title of Pezo and Ellrichshausen was, “Stern Nature, Stern Formal Idiom”, Hollmen, Reuter and Sandman’s title was, “Architecture to Help People” and Anna Heringer’s title was, “Architecture is a Tool to Improve Lives.” Figure 3shows the METI - a handmade school in Rudrapur, Bangladesh. Designed by Anna Heringer and Eike Roswag this building was built between 2005 and 2006. Figure 4 shows the Women’s centre in Rufisque,  Senegal designed by Hollmén, Reuter, and Sandman between 1995 and 2001. 

Figure 4

 

 

So, what was happening here? Why was this confusion so obvious? If we consider, as Finnish architectural critic Pekka Suhonen does, that there is a difference between critique and meta-critique [1], it firstly looked like the theme of the symposium was to be a critique (of existing value system in the main-stream architecture), rather than a clarification of the specific concepts, patterns and practices in relation to aesthetic values (or meta-critique). Secondly, within the category of critique, it would be beneficial to differentiate between negative critical evaluation and approving evaluation. This latter distinction is clarified by Finnish environmental aesthetician Yrjö Sepänmaa [2] with a distinction between critical and positive critique. He uses this distinction in environmental aesthetics, but it is easily applicable in architectural contexts as well. If you are critical, you weigh the object (natural or man-made phenomena) against value set in order to improve future decisions in this area. If you are approaching the object positively, you are searching to understand and accept its presence. Also, in my mind, you do not challenge its existence, for it is somehow out of your reach. The object of evaluation has transcendental qualities (like ‘nature’ has in our minds). Maybe this approving approach could be called journalism, when an everyday kind of writing is employed which looks for the object in its own terms [3]. 

The Argentinean pair didn’t explore their value system at all. Their presentation was self-referential and touched on the formal qualities of space layered in Japanese-like manner. Unlike other speakers they also didn’t talk about their method or process. They rejected this question as they view method a private matter. This elitist attitude was in sharp contrast with the symposium spirit and was felt by participants which gathered in Jyvaskylä with a specific topic in mind. Pezo and Ellrichshausen’s practice wasn’t a critical practice at all. It appeared to be a private esoteric game in a similar manner to the Glass Bead Game (1943) by Hermann Hesse (1877 – 1962). Context such as participation or public opinion didn’t matter. Even if the couple used local concrete on-site techniques and was fully engaged with spatial aesthetics, context was overlooked. Their contribution to the new wave of ethically concerned practices, which  engages with construction techniques (i.e. Concretism) was minimal. Their practice creates a modernistic and autonomous architecture which could be called immaterial concretism. Even if the architecture of Pezo and Ellrichshausen, and let us say Anna Heringer, Holmen and Reuter Sandman, were tied to the local building techniques, and even if these are all concerned with the sequences of space, the perception is quite different. The former is about the interior space-slicing based on an undefined pattern and the latter cases present spatial formations with a social slant. Either the explanations or the lack of explanation, as in the Argentinean couple’s case, effected their perceptions of space. They are somehow fundamentally different. However, their concerns regarding space and light take place in a characteristically a-contextual manner. 

The case was more poignant given Juhani Pallasmaa’s lecture, just before the talk by Mauricio Pezo and Sophia von Ellrichshausen. Pallasmaa pointed to his favourite demand. He demands that we not indulge in personal expression, but rely in design on the eternal values of human space as a built memory and concretised in a value system. His talk, as well, aroused a lot of confusion and questions amongst the participants. He used his familiar pose to condemn the personal expression and rely on local traditions and materials (which appears to be an acceptable and decent position). Firstly, of course the word expression is polluted, contaminated and politically suspicious from the times when Modernism emerged. At this time there was a fight against spatially engaged architecture where the un-decorative nudity of abstraction was preferred in architecture.  When it is used, it almost without exception received a condemning connotation [4].
 

In spite of his objection of a spatially overwhelming ‘expressionism’ in architecture (represented in Carlo Scarpa’s, Friedensreich Hundertwasser’s and Frank Gehry’s architectures) it was anyhow obvious in rather confusing way that Pallasmaa favoured the Argentinian couple’s work containing a kind of spatial authenticity. Is this kind of architecture of the authentic and beyond critical critique, as in case of ‘nature’ which is left untouched in its transcendental a priori. It appeared, in an oblique and indirect way, as some architecture can avoid the critical critique. As such, its critical evaluation and positioning in the social, historical or cultural value system remains elusive. It would rather stay in an a-historic or a-society realm takes place in such a way that this type of architecture could be evaluated solely according to the positive critique’s pose. 

Jeffrey Kipnis offers an answer to this. He opposes the idea of a critical practice as there were two or more competing philosophies in architecture fighting for the subordinating position – as embodied, finalised and hermetic meanings of architecture. He rather prefers architecture to create alternative, ambiguous positions outside the value systems offering various interpretations. He says, “The alternative attitude derives from the fact that architecture is an authentic discipline, yet one in continuous transformation.”[5] The presentation by Argentineans gave no contextual acknowledgment allowing them to freely positioned themselves as able to embody the truth of architecture, as in modernism. Criticising them would mean that we didn’t like their forms, as if that was the course of astonishment. Peter Collins famously stated that once Modernism was established the method, approach and value systems were no one’s concern anymore. The critique shifted from the meta-level towards a critique of images and styles; it was a paradigmatic shift. The question regarding whose taste prevails is connected to this position. The only acceptable critique in the couple’s case was to be formal. All the other presentations avoided the modernistic stance by arguing for their socio-ethical or technological stance. It certainly appears that a paradigmatic shift has taken place. 

The question now becomes, from which angle are we able to justify a critique of a piece of architecture which does not care about demonstrating any localities, traditions or cultural patterns? Firstly, like in architectural schools, if a student does not declare the starting position or clarify where the spatial game originates from their architectural reviewers are able to destroy the piece instantly using critics’ own value systems. It means that if it is not explicitly declared any value system can be applied to any work. 

The participants of the 11^thAlvar Aalto symposium were to criticise, evaluate, compare and make judgements about the presentations. Only it appeared that because there was one who positioned themselves out of the context of the symposium, they were targeted as an outsider, as an odd exception of the socially aware militants of future improvements of deprived areas around the globe. The context in the case of Poze and Ellrichshausen was undecided, and must be read from the formal attributes of the images we were given. All the other presentations localised themselves in a socio-ethical concretic realm. 

References: 

(2009) 11th International Alvar Aalto Symposium.  Available at: http://www.alvaraalto.fi/symposium/2009/index.htm (Accessed: 23 September). 

(2009) Anna Heringer Available at: http://www.anna-heringer.com/index.php?id=31 (Accessed: 23 September). 

(2009) Hollmen Rueter Sandman Architects.  Available at: http://www.hollmenreutersandman.com/index2.php (Accessed: 23 September). 

(2009) Hundertwasser.  Available at: http://www.hundertwasser.at/ (Accessed: 23 September). 

(2009) Pezo Von Ellrichshausen Architects.  Available at: http://www.pezo.cl (Accessed: 23 September). 

(2009) Rintala Eggertsson Architects.  Available at: http://rintalaeggertsson.com/ (Accessed: 23 September). 

Kipnis, J. (1992) ‘Picking up the Pieces’, in  Linder, M. and Bergren, A.(eds) Scogin, Elam, and Bray: Critical Architecture, Architectural Criticism.New York: Rizzoli, pp. 31-48. 

Koss, J. (2006) ‘On the Limits of Empathy’, The Art Bulletin, 139, (March 2006), pp. 139-157. 

Pallasmaa, J. (1980) ‘Our Future lies in Modernism’, Arkkitehti 5-6, pp. 47-48. 

Sepänmaa, Y. (2008) ‘To approve or to criticise? On the two tasks of environmental aesthetics’, Datutop, 30, pp. 78-88. 

Sharp, D. (1980) ‘The Role and Responsibility of the Architectural Critic’, Arkkitehti 1, pp. 48-50. 

Suhonen, P. (1978) ‘Arkkitehtuurin kritiikki ja estetiikka’, Arkkitehti, 7, pp. 14-5. 

Images: 

Figures 1 & 2: (2009) Pezo Von Ellrichshausen Architects.  Available at: http://www.pezo.cl (Accessed: 23 September). 

Figure 3: (2009) Anna Heringer Available at: http://www.anna-heringer.com/index.php?id=31 (Accessed: 23 September). 

Figure 4: (2009) Hollmen Rueter Sandman Architects.  Available at: http://www.hollmenreutersandman.com/index2.php (Accessed: 23 September). 

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[1] Suhonen 1978, 15. 

[2] Sepänmaa 2009, 79. 

[3] Anthony Vidler quotes Walter Benjamin by calling this a kind of ‘documentary’ criticism commentary, which falls under Sepänmaa’s category of positivecritique. Vidler in Linder 1992, 19. 

[4] Koss 2006. 

[5]Kipnis 1992, 38.

Inaugural Post by Carolyn Fahey

As an undergraduate I was indoctrinated with the idea that theoretical appeals were the most desirable and most acceptable method for approaching architectural design. This went OK for my first studio, but after my second and onto my third, each instructor introduced a different theory, and each one we students were to treat with the same unwavering devotion. I simply could not reconcile the obvious disparities between each method and my rejection of this left me alienated (and in the philosophy and comparative literature departments). Since then I have embarked on a PhD entirely devoted (at least it seems to me now after three years of study) to coming to terms with my emigration from the architecture school. My involvement with philosophy and comparative literature has allowed me to reconcile the use of concepts in architecture discourse and practice to a degree, but I hope that the opening of a platform meant for this sort of discussion helps to bring others interested in these problems together in hopes of coming to, in the very least, a better understanding of the appeal and role of theory in architecture practice. On this note, I warmly invite those interested to engage, and those tentative about this to maybe spend some time thinking about what they take architecture to actually be, and hopefully return to us with a response of some kind. Looking forward to what transpires.